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John Leslie King and Kenneth L. Kraemer 
University if Cdi$omia, Irvine, CA 92715, USA 
Information Resource Management, or IRM, is founded on 
the assumptions that o are systems amenable to 
systematic control, and that information is a reso-urce that can 
be managed in eoonomically efficient ways. The management 
techniques embodied under the IRM rubric are said to im- 
prove the efficiency and effectiveness of information manage- 
ment in organizations. These assumptions are questioned. Sys- 
tems approaches to organizations have proven inadequate in 
most instances where they have been tried, and there is little 
teasnll to believe the IRM approac!~ wiube different. Informa- 
tion is not a resource in the conventional sense of the term, 
and economic techniques for dealing with information as a 
resource are lacking. Implementation of IRM suffers from 
ambiguities about what it is supposed ~0 accomplish tke 
breadth of its intentions, and the practical constraints of 
implementing top-down reforms in complex ~3rgatitions. The 
broad vision of IRM is useful for articulating goals for Xor- 
mation .mgement, but the efficacy of IRM as .an organizing 
framework for actual management of information pbes is 
limited. 
Keywor& IRM, Information Resource Management, IS 
Management, Economics of IS. 
Nort olland 
Information Resource Management burst on 
the scene in the early 1980’s with considerable 
fanfare. The IRM concept has laudable inten- 
tions: the treatment of information as a resource 
to be managed effectively and efficiently; the de- 
velopment of consistent information management 
policies, principles and standards; and evaluation 
and enforcement o ensure that the objectives of 
IRM are being accomplishe& It also ties together 
various information handling techniques, includ- 
ing paper-based systems, reprographics, com- 
pnterize4i systems, and telecommunications ys- 
tems. Under IRM, it is said, the management of 
information should be made more economical, 
more effective, and more supportive of fundamen- 
tal organizational and social goals ([21], [23], [25], 
The II&f concept has considerable appeal, but 
IRM in practice his been quite different from the 
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ideal [14]. This paper explores questions about the 
soundness of the intellectual rationales behind 
IRM and the practicality of its use as an organiz- 
ing concept for managing information incomplex 
organizations. It places IRM in an intellectual 
framework where it can be assessed by those who 
support, oppose, or simply question the concept. 
2 Is the fRM Concept Sensibie? 
The IRM concept rests on two fundamental 
beliefs: *ha: organizations are systems amenable 
to systematic ontrol, and that information is a 
resource amenable to economic analysis and ra- 
tional management. We explore each in detail. 
Organizations as Systems 
The first belief is that organizaticns ‘Pre com- 
plex systems, and that management is tie task of 
designing and controlling such systems [7]. 
Organizations assimilate “inputs,” process them 
in some predictable manner, and produce “out- 
puts.” Some inp~+.s are used to keep the produc- 
tion system operhting; others are transformed into 
outputs. Efficiency and effectiveness of producing 
gh cybernetic feedback, in which 
e system use knowledge about 
performance to alter pr&Gction processes. Most 
of the writin& XI IRM begins with at least an 
implicit chpxacterization of management as con- 
+~ol f systems. 
The systems view of organizations is popular 
but it 1~s serious limitations. Systems views derive 
from positivistic, and usually mechanistic, con- 
cepts about o ’ tional behavior. Real organi- 
zations, parti cor”.6plex organizations, ex- 
!ibit behaviors thar confound systems explana- 
tions ([a], [ZO]). For example, moss organizations 
do not have clear goals and objectives on 
organization& participants agree. Urdcrstanding 
of intended organizational outputs, and ;hus goals 
and objectives, vary from person to person and 
subgroup to subgroup. TTie actions t&en by 
organizations are due as much to co1 
internal dissent as they are io consensu 
tional deliberation. The system 
tally useful, ut until there is 
standing of subsystems n% th 
as well as the ways these war 
system, the overall approach has limited prescrip- 
tive value. 
Research on the impact of computing systems 
on organizations has revealed the weakness of the 
systems approach to understanding computing 
([9], [26], 1281, [29], [31]) though few IRM discus- 
sants make special note of the political aspects of 
organizational ife that make application of the 
system concept difficult ([HI, [30]). As long as 
control over information affects power relation- 
ships, making absolute hierarchies of authority 
difficult to maintain, the systems-oriented per- 
spective of II&I wisi be difficult to maintain. 
The political character of organizational ife 
readily illustrates this weakness of IRM in the 
IRM debate itself. IRM serves particular interests 
within organizations. It is a movement led by 
people with a stake in its success. Proponents of 
RN are generally information systems managers 
or consultants to such managers. They address 
themselves to peopie like themselves ([13], 8223, 
[38], [39]). Information system professionals desire I 
to expand their jurisdiction within the organiza- 
tion, and see II&I as a mea of doing so. They 
are stakeholders in the IRM concept, and II&I’s 
implementation benefits them directly. How does 
one diffGrenti;ate the self-serving, promotional 
components of the IIU’vI vision from the rational 
bases on which the IIWI concept is argued? The 
systems view does not answer the question. 
systems view offers an abstrac; framework 
assessing how to deal ovltb information in organi- 
zations, but the abstraction is too ex 
Injormss’:m as a Resource 
belief is that industrialized econo- 
mies we moving toward being “information econ- 
omies,” and thrt managers 
information as a resource in 
fli mage 1,:~ ‘2 traditional resources uch as capital, 
lti?d and labor. Information, therefore, cannot be 
ignored as 2 critical organizational resourze. Anal- 
og.& are &awn to air and water, once considered 
free goods but now considered resources [21]. In- 
formation is considered an important input to the 
oiga&atiocal system and must be managed as a 
resource. 
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formance in order to be sensible, and this poses -.. 
problems. The tools to assess the economic value 
of information are not well developed ([HI, [19]). 
It is extremely difficult to place a value on infor- 
mation ([3], [4], IS], [12], [37]). Every piece of in- 
formation has potential value in hypothetical 
situations that might arise, but how does one 
judge whether collection and retention of informa- 
tion is justifiable, g&n the hypothetical value of 
information? The values imposed wiIl be judge- 
mental and case=specGc, making a mockery of the 
effort to establish objective value for information 
across agencies. 
IRM prqX5ncnts suggats application of an 
analog of the economic valuation process used for 
natural resources. Unfortunately, there important 
limits to the assignment of value even to commod- 
ities such as minerals and water for which the 
term resource have traditionally been used [Ml. 
Among other things, most resources must be val- 
ued in some larger economic context that accounts 
for externalities such as pollution and waste aris- 
ing from exploitation and use of the resource. 
Simple market economics does not deal well ~~4th 
such externalities, making the true value of 
resources difficult to ascertain. The use of “ex= 
perts” to impose values to account fcr extemali- 
ties is common practice, but this merely shifts the 
uncertainty to the task of deciding which expert to 
believe. 
This problem could conceivably disappear when 
economists become more a+t at dealing with it, 
but uncertainty is only one part of the problem 
with the valuation of information. Another is that 
information cannot be intrinsically scarce once it 
is created. It can be given away to literally every- 
one in the world and still retain its intrinsic value, 
and it is not depleted through use. There is no 
need to replenish the supply unless the original 
information is lost. In order to impose economic 
value on information one must create artificial 
scarcity. This is possible in two ways: mainte- 
nance of economic control over intellectual prop- 
erty such as -written works and socware, tradition- 
alIy done through copyright; and imposition of 
artifical scarcity by restricting dissemination. The 
former is difficult to ensure because modern tech- 
nologies for photocopy reproduction have made it 
impossible to c 
ation is increa 
transfer. Restricting 
dissemination is useful only so long as the restric- 
tion is enforced. Once information is in the hands 
of a party !!w dn=s ubu not subscribe to the restric- 
tion, the ease of copying makes the imposition of 
artificial scarcity difficult. Lack of inherent scarc- 
ity makes information very difficult to cateeorize 
as a resource in economic terms. 
The II&M view dots encourage attention to the 
economic importance of information (the lack of 
it, the collection of it, the maintenance of it, and 
the use of it), and this is useful But strictly 
speaking, the IRM focus on resources is much 
more sensibly directed toward the components of 
ir$ormation handling than toward information it- 
self. 
Workable? 
IRM proponents argue that specitic attention 
to t;ae management of information within +he 
organization will enhance 0rganizationaI effi- 
ciency and effectiveness. This is in keeping with 
long-standing ideas on development and man+- 
ment of computer-based information systems (e.g., 
[2], [IO], [32], [4@. IRM promises to improve the 
planning, controlhng, accounting and budgeting 
of information requirements, allowing managers 
to select the best mix of information resources to 
do a given job. It will a!:~ help deal with informa- 
tion overload, provide a rigorous and discipline 
framework in which to evaluate the benefits of 
collecting and u&g information against the costs 
of doing so, provide an incentive for managers to 
reduce the amount of information they require to 
a minimum pad give management a working tool 
to deal with increasing information costs [24]. 
This is a tall order, and one should question 
whether the. noble goals articulated by the 1R.M 
proponents can be achieved. Two issues of IRM 
workability are worth considering: whether the 
cure is better than the sickness, and whether there 
will be unanticipated effects from implementation 
7%~ Sickness and the Cure 
It is not clear that traditional ways of dealing 
with information in organizations, with all their 
aws, are so unbearably bad that I is neces- 
sary. All aspects of information management bring 
10 SOS In&wuztion & Management 
costs, but are these costs ‘6 too high?” With few 
eAceptiGns, only a small fraction of organizations’ 
operating budgets are spent on computetied data 
processing. More is spent on the processing of 
information outside of data processing, but even 
so, it is doubtful that these costs represent more 
t&m a fraction of most organizations’ expendi- 
tures. There is probably always room for improve- 
mcnt, but the proponents of IRM provide little 
evidence that IRM is anything more than a margi- 
nal solution to a marginal problem. 
Tnere is also a problem with the breadth of 
objectives IIU4 is expected to achieve. IRM 
focuses on the big picture of organizational in- 
formation use; a lofty goal but an impractical one 
in the context complex organizations. Herfindahl 
[17] notis that in most circumstances it is pointless 
to spend too much time on the “overall rationale” 
behind information collection and use because 
most organizational decisions address narrowly 
circumscribed issues, and not organization-wide 
goals and objectives. The information needed for 
most decisions is gathered by those involved with 
the decision, and not by central elites. Decisions 
that do involve organization-wide goals usually 
require information that is hard to come by: stra- 
tegic information about the current state, probable 
futures, and the likely consequences of alternative 
actions. Such information seldom resides in usable 
form in the databases of subunits. For these rea- 
sons it is cr mistake to move from the top down in 
assessing organizational information management 
practices. 
The broad array of IRM objectives pecifies a 
set of control tasks so sweeping that the II&I 
e;i<i;utive would have to be super-human to ac- 
ccmplish them. In addition to overseeing all exist- 
ing data processing operations, those in charge of 
IRM would be called on to control all information 
entering into corporate decisions, to change other 
managers’ minds so they view information as a. 
resource, and to ensure that organizational infor- 
mation needs are considered routinely in all aspects 
of the organization’s enterprise. Levitan (30 : 327) 
provides list of “corporate-wide” IRM objectives 
drawn from work by ([l], [ll]) and others; it 
includes ten ckrges to the executive: (1) 
Ensuring that only relevant (not all) in ation 
flows into corporate decisions; (2) sure 
that costs of getting 
are compared wit projected benefits; (3) C 
ing people’s attitudes so that information becomes 
viewed as a major asset in the organization; (4) 
Analyzing requirements before acquiring informa- 
tion technologies instead of the reverse; (5) Legiti- 
mizing the role of the Information Manager so he 
or she can challenge other managers on their IIU4 
practices; (6) Establishment of training so other 
managers can implement the IRM program; (7) 
Making users responsible for their information 
activities by including them in system design and 
other decisions, charging them for services, and 
making them accountable for resources they need 
to produce information; (8) Identification of in- 
house and outside opportunities for improving 
applications of information resources to organiza- 
tional decisions and problems: (9) Fixing accoun- 
tability for use and husbandry of information 
resources on designated people in the organiza- 
tion; and (10) Making consideration of organiza- 
tional information needs routine in all aspects of 
the enterprise. 
This describes a person with exceptional skiUs 
in administration, budgeting, information tkory, 
technical systems, planning, policymaking, human 
relations, and operational knowledge of the 
organization’s functions; such people are likely to 
be hard to find. Moreover, any manager with this 
mandate would face formidable obstacles in over- 
coming the inertia of established organizational 
practice, not to mention the obstreperous actions 
of other top-level administrators attempting to 
contain the extraordinary power implied in the job 
description of the IIW executive. 
This condition produces confusion over just 
what IIWI is supposed to accomplish. Although 
Levitan claims that IRM is more a management 
philosophy than a method for management 
[30:227], it is not clear what this philosophy is 
supposed to address at the practical level. IRM is 
enacted to treat information as a resource, but in 
practice its focus is mainly on the management of 
information technology ([5], [22], [23], [34], [35], 
[dtl]). The great breadth of IRM objectives is so 
far our of the reach of most 
practice, their IIWI “strategy’ 
volves to management of technology. The goal of 
managing information seldom is resurrected. This 
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for. This requires careful attentior to organixa- about information management within the mission 
tional missions, and thus to the ideologies of key to the agencies themselves. A centralized approach 
organizational actors and their beliefs about what to handling information is unlikely to help improve 
is “appropriate.” Efforts to control use of the the performance of subunits, and is probably a 
technology will seldom alter the larger issues of waste Of time for top management. In some cases 
information management. A discrepancy between there probably is a leg%mate need for mnsolidat- 
the larger vision of IRM and its shortcomings in hg control ov’:r aspects of informsticn b&g 
practice is not surprising. Managerial inform to high-level mpoagers, but in practice top 
movements often do little more than temporarily managers seldom want to deal with such tasks. 
redirect peoples’ attention from routine activities They usudy hmd rhe control for such tasks over 
to basic issues. And in this small way they can be the data proce+ng professionals, in spite of the 
very useful. But IRM could bring more serious stated IRM objective of f,:using top management 
consequences by lulling organizational leaders into attention on the issues. This seems to erode fur- 
thinking information is being managed well when ther the expectation that IRM will pfodtt~e its 
it is not. hoped-for results. 
Possible Unanticipated Effects 
IRM has the potential to bring about serious, 
unanticipated effects in organizations. These ap- 
pear not to have occurred to the IRM proponents, 
and in fact, work against the implicit goals of 
those proponents. 
One of these possible tide effects is the produc- 
tion of subtle tendencies toward centralization. 
Every articulation of IRM implementation strategy 
carries the call for the creati,n of an IRM manager, 
whose job is it to govern nearly all aspects of 
organization information activity. The IRM “cor- 
porate-wide” objectives listed above demonstrate 
the extraordinary authority this manager would 
hold over activities central to the organization’s 
functioning. Although proponents of IRM do not 
argue for centralization, or emborly it as a goal of 
II&M, they do nothing to dispell the prospect of 
centralization inherent in their statement of IRM 
objectives. Centralization is not necessarily a bad 
thil,, but it should be a matter of conscious 
policy rather than an artifact of other policies. In 
pny case, the consequences of centralization should 
be clear. A useful axiom in considering centralixa- 
tion/decentralization issues is that those closest 
to the problem are the best determiners of how to 
solve the problem [27]. Organizational depart- 
ments manage information in the context of ac- 
complishing their missions, and not as an endin 
itself. It does not make sense to abstract informa- 
tion management from the programmatic missions 
of s ts. ccou ty S e foe 
imstead in mission performance, leaving decisions 
Perhaps more important than IRM’s contribu- 
tion to an illusion of efficiency and effectiveness i
the potential IIWI-spawned constrdints on the col- 
le&~u of information. These constraints arise from 
the “cost-benefit” presumptions in IRM. Since it 
is almost always easier to estimate costs of data 
collection than to estimate the dollar value of 
benefits, strict cost-benefit analyses usually focus 
on costs. Decisions based mainly on cost discount 
other criteria, such a~ need, and can easily suggest 
that needs are “not proven”. Much organizational 
informatisn is collected as insurance, on the chance 
that it might be needed. The t-~&tics used to 
determine what information should be collected 
and kept for such pzpoces are not easily amena- 
ble to cost-benefit analysis. They might, for exam- 
ple, be based 0-Q on the hunches of experienced 
people who are close to the issues at stake. In the 
absence of rigorous cost-benefit analysis, decisions 
to collect and keep information are usually left to 
those with such experience. It is difficult to pre- 
dict whether a move toward more formal analysis 
of cr,sts and benefits for collecting and keeping 
information will improve judgemznt OE such 
matters. II&f proponents argue that vague rea- 
sons for collecting and keeping information are a 
primary cause of waste in information manage- 
ment, akin to keeping unnecessary inventory on 
hand. Perhaps this is so, but the issue is not 
whether it is sensible to keep “only what is 
needed.” the issue is how one determines “what is 
needed”. The formal analysis approach based on 
the assumption that information ean be trea:ed as 
a resource is not, at first glance, a promising 
ent for current eans of making such 
determinations. 
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4. A Different Interpretation of the Message 
The critique above is aimed primarily at IBM 
in its most pure and attracttife form. In a world of 
fallible people and missed expec+ations, it is 
advisable to ask whether there kg value in a com- 
promised view of IBM. We believe there is. Con- 
ceptual and practical problems notwithstanding, 
IBM makes several useful contributions to the 
problem of dealing with inform&ion and informa- 
tion technology. 
The Growing Importance of Information 
Whether or not economics has come to grips 
with information, it is clear that information in its 
various fomc h~c become increasingly important *- **- ” 
to organizations. II&I recognizes this fact, and 
calls attention to it in a compelhng manner. New 
developments over the decades have brought about 
important changes in organizational life, and new 
organizational arrangements have arisen to deal 
with them. The organization of labor, for example, 
was initially fought by management, hen accepted 
through compromise, and eventuahy accommod- 
ated through the institutionalization of manage- 
ment jobs for labor relations specialists. A similar 
but more recent example ie the establishment of 
special offers in organizations to deal with prob- 
lems of aff; -native action, environmental impact, 
and legislative relations. In some ways, the IRlM 
rnovamfi --,nt is a call to acticq for organizational 
leaders to recognize the growing importance of 
information in the organization. Even if the move- 
ment does not succeed in its larger goals of creat- 
ing, in the minds of managers, a resource-oriented 
view of information, it is already raising the con- 
sciousness of management about the need to pay 
attention the information-related issues. 
The IBM movements also fills a void in organi- 
zations between the growing managerial awareness 
of the importance of information processing func- 
tions and the ultimate purpose for information 
processing. As long as information processing has 
was either an ad hoc concern of department-level 
functionaries or a specific task for data processing 
specialists, it was just e any other “back office” 
activity. It was acknowle 
organization, but only in the 
keeping the telephones 
system functional were i 
tions have become more depending on computer- 
based systems for managerial and other tasks, it 
has become difficult for managers to dismiss 
information processing in such a cavalier manner. 
But in the absence of a broader goal and purpose 
for processing information, there has been no 
target for managers to aim at. IBM provides such 
a target, albeit a flawed and abstract one. It 
elevates information to the status of such critical 
itrganizatiooal inputs as capital, labor and land. 
The fact that information is really quite unlike 
these resources makes many of IBM% specific 
recommendations problematic. But the expression 
of a broader vision fez the challenge of informa- 
tion processing is a valuable service. It is im- 
portant not to dismiss this useful contribution 
simply because there are problems in the more 
obvious features of the IBM concept. 
New Status for Information Systems 
By raising the sights of managers toward the 
goals of information processing, IBM has the 
immediate but secondary effect of foeusing 
managerial attention on the infrastructure and 
apparatus of information processing. While the 
might be abstract, intangible, and 
the existing systems for handling 
concrete and in need of serious 
in many organizations has fallen 
far short of i=s loftier aims, but has contributed 
great bringing needed support to the IS func- 
tion. ng other things, the IBM rubric calls for 
treating the processing of informatio-1 as a special 
and valuable organizational function worthy of 
investment and nurturing. 
The staggering growth in organizational 
expenditures on information systems over the past 
decade has already captured the attention of top 
management, but the .%tention has often been 
hostile. Large expenditures usually evoke ques- 
tions of return on investment, payoff and payback, 
and so on. Unfortunately, demonstrating direct 
and tangible cost savings from IS activities is 
exceedingly difficult to do. IS managers are often 
ta:~ks performed by computing applications to the 
Information & Management 
challenge of managing the organization’s critical 
information activity. Even if the concept does not 
hold up under careful scrutiny, it captures the 
imagination of managers who understand chat 
ephemeral concepts like organizational strategy, 
employee morale, and business good will are im- 
portant factors in business success. This is an 
importaut breakthrough for the IS profession. 
A Useful Rallying Point 
Finally, IBM, with all its problems, does pro- 
vide a useful rallying point for people with 
academic and professional interests in organiza- 
tional information systems, mznagement, and in- 
formation economics. The goal of IBM efforts 
should not be to whitewash the shxtcomings of 
the current articulation of IBM, but to make 
progress on the constituent components of IBM in 
the broader interest of making progress toward 
the effective and efficient use of information in 
organizations. Managerial reforms pome and go, 
and the list is long: Planned Program Budgeting; 
Zero Base Budgeting; Management by Objectives; 
Management by Walking Around, and so on. All 
offer more than they can deliver, and all make a 
contribution to effective manageLlent. IBM is 
likely to do the same. This is not an ignoble 
destiny; it is merely less noble than the IBM 
proponents prefer. 
5. Conclusions 
Movement oward IBM has been slow, and the 
problems noted above suggest IBM in it’s full 
articulation might be unimplementable. Mehra [33] 
makes the plea not to let IBM become a buzz- 
word. This fate could well befall IBM as an 
. . 
orgaruzmg rubn, *n for management of information 
and information technology. But it would be un- 
fortunate if the larger vision of II?M then was lost. 
IBM derives much of its impetus from the ob- 
servation that collection, maintenance, and use of 
information can be expensive, and those costs 
should be at least offset by benefits gained. This 
seems a perfectly sensible concept for guiding 
decisions about information related activities, as 
long as the shortcomings of economic knowledge 
heation context 
are borne in mind. The shortcomings in economic 
J.L King, K.L Kraemer / IRM: Is it Sensibie? 13 
knowiedge constrain our ability to determine with 
precision the real utility of information-related 
tasks, and thus make the concrete goals of 
benefit-cost analysis em&e. 
We doubt that the IBM reform movement will 
produce the desired changes articulated by IRM 
proponents. However, with sufficient care and at- 
tention to the lessons that are learned from the 
IBM experience, the practicability of the underly- 
ing concepts of IRM could be improved dramati- 
caky over the coming decades. 
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